10 Against market rules

A Spanish shipyard nobody wanted (except workers)

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Introduction

From construction of the Dock to the creation of Naval Gijón

Modern industrial shipbuilding in Gijón has its origin in the late nineteenth century. In 1892, a dry dock was built enabling construction and repair of ships. Because of its dimensions (87 m long, 14 m wide and 5.2 m deep), it had capacity for small and medium-sized hulls. Throughout its history and despite the many changes of business ownership, this shipyard was known as El Dique (the Dock), distinguishing it from the rest of shipyards in the Bay of Gijón.[1] The Dock is part of a larger industrial complex where, in addition to the construction and repair of boats, boilers, engines, and machinery were also manufactured.

After various vicissitudes, in the period immediately after the Spanish Civil War, (1941) El Dique became part of one of the oldest and most important of Asturian industrial business partnerships: Duro Felguera, which at that time had a large number of coal and iron mines, a steel factory, and workshops manufacturing heavy machinery, as well as a shipping fleet for the transportation of minerals.[2] El Dique's inclusion in the vertically integrated Duro Felguera conglomerate gave the shipyard stability over four decades.

Prior to the 1950s the Spanish economy had suffered from decapitalisation, technological backwardness, weakness of internal markets, international isolation, and stagnation. However, its shipbuilding industry experienced rapid growth from the 1950s and, above all, the 1960s; this growth linked to industrial expansion and aid policies operated by the state.[3] This boom was accompanied by modernisation of production which left behind sections of the craft-based workforce. The previous fabrication of moulds in wood to guide cutting of metal plates and manual riveting of plates of the hull of ships were replaced by machine cutting and electric arc welding. Nevertheless,

1 Toral Alonso, "Breve historia del Dique de Gijón".
2 For Duro Felguera, see Ojeda, *Duro Felguera*.
3 For this period, see, for example, Houpt and Ortiz-Villajos, *Astilleros españoles*.

workers in qualified trades were retrained. At the same time, the increase in workload in boom conditions fed a growing need for labour that was met by extensive recourse to sub-contracting. Auxiliary companies supplied an increasing proportion of the work needed by the shipyard but this did not have a great impact on the permanent staff of the parent company. El Dique had 378 full-time employees in 1962 and 316 in 1974; however, the number of sub-contractors working in the shipyard increased, with those workers on less favourable contractual terms and conditions.[4]

The phenomenon of outsourcing became a key part of management strategy during the peak years of demand in the 1960s and early 1970s. It helped the company reduce costs, introduce flexible employment depending on demand, and weaken unionisation. However, the abundant supply of jobs existing in the metallurgical industries for skilled workers and the youth of most contract workers sowed the seeds of persistent conflict. The contractual divergence among workers who shared tasks and spaces delineated by one or another company's name embroidered on their work clothes or by the colour of their helmets created comparative grievances and generated a climate of discontent and a suitable ground for trade union activists to encourage political opposition against the Franco dictatorship. Reports of the so-called *prestamismo laboral* ("phantom" companies that lacked capital, facilities, and machinery, but served as intermediaries to supply workers to the parent company) assumed a growing importance in workers' claims. This discontent unleashed two successive strikes in the early months of 1975, leading to a victory for the workforce, who achieved the incorporation of all outsourced labour as fixed in the payroll of the shipyard, which doubled the number of permanent workers employed.[5]

This led to a profound alteration of the balance of power in relationships between company and workers. The latter became extraordinarily cohesive and strong; however, it coincided with the first symptoms of the crisis in the shipbuilding sector in the wake of the downturn in demand occasioned by the OPEC price hikes of 1973-1974.[6] The company had lost its ability to regulate the volume of employment through sub-contracting and was faced

4 *Asturias Semanal*, no. 317, July 1975.

5 See Vega Garcia, *La Corriente Sindical de Izquierda.*

6 During the economic expansion of the 1960s and the early 1970s, Spain became one of the world's leaders in shipbuilding, ranking third in 1974. Its merchant shipbuilding industry was one of the few major industries in the country that made little use of foreign capital. Shipbuilding, both in Spain and among other shipbuilding nations, was, however, one of the main casualties of the post-1974 energy crisis; following a sharp drop in orders in the late 1970s, the shipbuilding sector was in serious difficulty. Among Spain's leading industries, it was one of those most affected

with an oversized payroll (more than 700 workers between 1976 and 1982) in a period of low demand. The threat of the company reducing wages or rights was resisted by a highly unionised, spirited, and self-confident workforce buoyed by the death of Franco and return to democracy.[7] The Dock of Duro Felguera became, between 1976 and 1980, the focus of frequent, intense, and prolonged industrial conflicts. Union leaderships, organisational loyalties, and forms of collective action that had originated at the end of the dictatorship crystallised in the years of democratic transition. They remained almost immutable in the following decades through productive restructuring, defence of employment, and the struggle for the survival of the shipyard.[8]

Crisis and shipbuilding restructuring policies

For a few years, membership in a diversified industrial group (although Duro Felguera had abandoned mining and steel activity, but maintained a significant presence in the manufacture of heavy machinery and assembly) served to mitigate adverse market conditions. Construction for the fleet of Duro Felguera was an interim solution but one which could not be extended indefinitely. At the same time, in a more general framework, policy measures that aimed at an orderly restructuring of the sector, inaugurated by agreements signed in 1979, were delayed due to the weakness of the government, the instability of the new democratic system, and the expected strength of union resistance. Consequently, the restructuring of the Spanish shipbuilding sector was not undertaken effectively until 1983, when a socialist government, in tandem with trade unions (the socialist UGT, Union General de Trabajadores), initiated closures of facilities, reductions in productive capacity, and losses of a large number of jobs. This policy of industrial restructuring resulted in the closure of three shipyards in Gijón and the reduction of the volume of direct employment by more than one-third, from 3,384 to 2,138 people employed in shipbuilding in the two companies which remained open: a private company (Naval Gijón) and a state-owned enterprise (Juliana Constructora Gijónesa).[9]

by production cutbacks, closures, and reductions in personnel. The number of shipbuilding yards able to build steel-hulled vessels declined from forty-three in 1975 to thirty a decade later.

7 Juan Carlos was crowned on 22 November 1975, two days after Franco's death. In 1978, a Spanish constitution was approved by referendum; it established a constitutional monarchy in Spain, bringing the years of dictatorship to an end.

8 Vega Garcia, "La fuerza del pasado".

9 Vega Garcia, *Crisis industrial y conflicto social*.

Table 10.1 Shipbuilding workforce in Gijón

	1974	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990
Juliana Constructora Gijónesa	908	1,768	1,665	1,497	1,426	1,235	995	786
Astilleros del Cantabrico y Reira	571	533	616	588	578			
S.M. Duro-Felguera (Dique)	316	705	715	699	635			
Maritima del Musel SA	170	324	315	309	298			
Industria Auxiliar Interna	1,778	197	177	169	162			
Industria Auxiliar Externa		630	438	320	285	152	151	126
Naval Gijón SA						742	742	595
TOTAL Gijón	**3,743**	**4,157**	**3,926**	**3,582**	**3,384**	**2,129**	**1,888**	**1,507**

Source: Censos de empresas y Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo, author's calculations

For the private yards, restructuring measures meant the creation of a new company resulting from the merger of two pre-existing Gijón shipyards: Duro Felguera and the smaller (Marítima del Musel) to form Naval Gijón SA in 1985, operating on the old facilities of the Dock. The new company was 50 per cent owned by both original companies, which in practice meant the segregation of the shipyard from the rest of the industrial group Duro Felguera. As in Spain generally, the restructuring measures implemented by the socialist government were the source of intense conflict, and led to prolonged challenges by the workers directly concerned; such measures also directly affected the population of the districts where the shipyards were located. In Gijón, barricades of burning tyres and clashes with the police became part of everyday life. With clockwork regularity, workers occupied the streets of the city every Tuesday and Thursday for almost three years, highlighted by black columns of smoke from the barricades and the sound of police sirens. Contemporaneously, the city of Gijón was paralysed up to four times throughout 1984 by general strikes called in protest against the industrial crisis and, in particular, about the situation of the shipyards.

The extraordinary capacity of workers to mobilise in the culminating phase of industrial restructuring was maintained long after it developed; however, it had to cope with significant union division. Internal fractures affected not only organisations but also workers, who were divided by the intense conflicts held in the years of democratic transition. In the final phase of the dictatorship, the CCOO (Comisiones Obreras, or Workers' Commissions, usually led by Communists) completely dominated the leadership in many conflicts which occurred, but in the new democratic context other

unions managed to strengthen their presence in the shipyard. The more reluctant to strike were found in the socialist trade union UGT. A split in the CCOO created a new organisation, Corriente Sindical de Izquierda (CSI). CSI supported protest in the streets, and boasted the most prestigious leaders. However, both CCOO and CSI formed an alliance representing the majority of the shipyard workforce and based their strategy on radical mobilisation and prolonged resistance.[10]

The critical phase of industrial restructuring in the mid-1980s, when the size of the payroll, conditions of employment, and the productive capacity of the new company (Naval Gijón) had to be determined, was subject to great political, trade union, and business tensions. Workers were determined to retain their jobs and refused to accept any cuts to the workforce which did not include access to early retirement or guarantees of relocation in jobs with similar conditions.

In the case of Naval Gijón, the aim of Duro Felguera was initially to maintain a workforce of 350 employees, but the pressure of demonstrations and strikes finally set its size at 742. Negotiations between entrepreneurs, the regional government, and the UGT resulted in a plan that envisaged the construction of a new covered shipyard, investments amounting to 11 bn pesetas, and 975 employees; however, this plan did not come to fruition. Naval Gijón began its existence in extremely adverse conditions: reliant on the aged facilities of the Dock, without any improvement since the crisis had begun; undercapitalised; no workload; and a lack of will on the part of managers to solve structural problems. With no contracts for the construction of new vessels, the shipyard slipped down a slope of indebtedness with workers being laid off and forced to seek unemployment benefits.

A company looking for an employer

Against this background and with the threat of closure, the majority of workers and their leaders opted to find solutions through political pressure and strikes. In this way they managed to involve the Ministry of Industry of the regional government in the pursuit of contracts for the construction of ships and agitated for the return to the shipyard of their former co-workers

10 Franco banned the UGT after his victory in the Spanish Civil War until his death in 1975. The union emerged from underground during the democratic transition after Franco's death, as did the CCOO. The UGT and CCOO, between them, constitute the major avenues for workers' representation in today's Spain.

who had been declared redundant in 1985 and had not been offered alternative jobs. The demand for fulfilment of this promise originated a new round of conflicts in the 1987 Christmas period and again in the spring of 1989. After five years of strife and industrial restructuring, workers continued to insist on the return of some of the workforce who had been made redundant in 1985, refusing to accept any solution which did not include this. The progressive downsizing initiated by the company through early retirement was thus offset, despite the endemic lack of activity. In 1990, Naval Gijón had around 600 workers, but its financial situation was desperate. The bulk of the workforce and their representatives concentrated in the following years on avoiding the closure of the company. The shipyard's survival in the first half of the 1990s was aided by a series of seven of fifteen sophisticated Norwegian-designed 105M factory vessels for the Russian Far East Fleet being built by Naval Gijón; the other eight were built at the Factorias Vulcano yard in Vigo. Naval Gijón handed over *Sozidanie*, the fourth in the series in June 1992.[11] However, the continuance of shipbuilding owed more to the political mediation of the Asturian government than the passivity displayed by the directors of the company, given the stance of one of the shareholders (Duro Felguera) that it intended to disassociate itself from the sector.

When finally, in December 1996, Duro Felguera got rid of its shares in Naval Gijón, the reaction of the workers was intense, and resulted in demonstrations demanding the payment of previous commitments. This included a spectacular action that, in January 1997, occupied the attention of the media: an attack of Luddite proportions in which a large group of masked workers destroyed computers and furniture in a workshop belonging to Duro Felguera. This action did not prevent the workers garnering several thousand demonstrators only weeks later, revealing their remarkable ability to combine radical tactics with massive demonstrations around a common goal: the survival of the shipyard and jobs.

Somewhat incredibly, a shipowner, Victoriano Sayalero, purchased the 50 per cent shareholding which had belonged to Duro Felguera at the symbolic price of one peseta. The new owner was seen by the workers of Naval Gijón as a mere figurehead who enabled Duro Felguera to ignore their responsibilities. As a result, his first visit to Naval Gijón facilities was also his last: held against his will and threatened, he decided to give his shares to the other owner of the shipyard, the business group of the Orejas family, owner of the former Marítima del Musel shipyard at the time Naval Gijón was created.

11 *World Fishing*, 42:4 (April 1993), 26.

A short spring

The consolidation of management in one owner led to an active search for workload. Soon – and, to a great extent, as a result of the radical attitude of workers – the shipyard entered on a previously unexplored path: business management focused on the indispensable investments that would overcome obsolescence accumulated over more than twenty years, and labour relations driven towards co-operation around a shared objective of reaching viability. To ensure this change of course a new manager of the shipyard, the engineer Galo Baizán, was appointed. Baizán represented a new style of leadership. His entry on the scene could not have been more expressive: he publicly acknowledged in a newspaper interview that the shipyard could not stay open without the co-operation of the workforce. In line with this analysis, relations between the company and unions experienced a full turnaround. Up to then, all the dialogue had rested on the privileged treatment that the company gave to the more moderate UGT, closing all channels of dialogue with the more radical CSI and restricting contacts with its ally, the CCOO. Even when agreements were evident as a result of strikes and other actions, the right to approve them was reserved for the UGT, and UGT affiliates enjoyed more favourable treatment in the day-to-day running of the shipyard.

Suddenly, previous management-union and intra-union relationships were inverted and the new shipyard management opted to find understanding with those who held more conflicting attitudes than those who until then had been privileged by moderation. This openness to dialogue with those workers who had relied strongly on strikes and other actions inaugurated a period which could be considered as a trial of co-management. Over more than three years, all the important decisions related to conditions of work, the hiring of workers, and the sub-contracting of ancillary companies were the result of previous consultation and agreement with the trade unions, whose decisions in turn were agreed by workers' assemblies.

When the orderbook finally guaranteed full employment, the discourse that the workers had long sustained about the social returns provided by the shipyard translated into the decision to reduce overtime to a minimum to ensure that new jobs were created. In this way, newbuilds of vessels created 230 new jobs with terms and conditions that were identical to those of the permanent workforce. Performing tasks within the shipyard that had previously been outsourced limited such outsourcing to external phases of the production process and, under union supervision, contractors were monitored and urged to respect the labour rights of their workers.

This exceptional situation of harmony in labour relations and abundant workload at Naval Gijón generated both direct and indirect employment in the wider economy of the city and also provided the means for young workers to acquire trade qualifications. Permanent workers taught courses in which new entrants acquired the necessary skills of shipyard work, ensuring social integration of newcomers in a direct way. This change of industrial climate was aided by public funds which sometimes skirted the restrictions of EEC employment regulations, and was largely attributable to a willingness to consolidate social peace after the political pressure exerted by long years of demonstrations.

The new industrial harmony allowed the introduction of technological modernisation which enabled construction of more complex vessels than hitherto. After long years of paralysis, the association between the path of radical struggle of workers of Naval Gijón and its survival as a company was accepted by managers, political spokespeople, and media, within an environment which denoted an ostensible improvement of the social image of shipyard workforce who were converted from a permanent source of disturbances to an engine of industrial activity.

The change for the better in the situation of the shipyard also reinforced the professional pride of the workforce and their self-image. In a series of open days in 1996, the company attempted to show the local populace new investment in the shipyard, the favourable climate for expansion of output, and the positive effect this would have on the local economy. In these open days, managerial staff and middle management largely remained in the background, giving prominence to the workers. During the four open days, close to 5,000 people visited the facilities, with workers acting as improvised guides. They showed the newly acquired mechanical, welding, and pipe-bending equipment in the shipyard and also presented a kind of exhibition of photographs and "weapons" (slingshots, ball bearings, rockets, balaclavas, and so forth) used in their various strikes and demonstrations. The implicit message was to link new investment to the workers' struggles, which was not questioned by owners or managers. This message had some purchase as two years later, a local cultural institution decided to reward Naval Gijón workers for their history of struggle and organised a ceremony that was attended by representatives of the company.

By this stage there were broad expectations of reducing accumulated debt and stabilising a company hitherto at permanent risk of closing. Apart from the absence of labour conflicts, several factors contributed to this: investments amounting to 1.76 mn pesetas (more than €10.5 mn) were instituted in the 1995-1998 period, including two extensions of the dry dock to reach

130 m in length to enable the construction of larger ships. In addition, the company had a backlog of orders worth 45,000 mn pesetas (€270 mn). These levels of capital investment enabled the shipyard to build vessels of larger size and technological complexity, concentrating on factory ships, container carriers, and chemical tankers, and targeting foreign markets (mainly German and Norwegian shipowners).

The beginning of the end

This apparent overcoming of the seemingly endemic labour problems of Naval Gijón did not last: a bitter conflict occurred suddenly in early 2000. The trigger was an announcement by the company of the dismissal of ninety casual workers. Immediately, all activity was paralysed, and a strike began. For the permanent workforce, more than 200 new direct jobs that had been created in the years of industrial harmony were not only a source of pride, but also a promise of continuity of employment in the shipyard. The workforce saw the entry of younger colleagues as part of the necessary generational renewal. The links between fixed and temporary workers (sometimes reinforced by ties of kinship, neighbourhood, or militancy) had been cultivated through a conscious strategy to actively defend the homogeneity of working conditions. After several years of permanence, casual workers had increased the influence of the most combative union, the CSI, and had assimilated many of the veterans' tactics. The announcement of layoffs signalled an outbreak of hostilities and led workers to occupy the shipyard leading to heavy fighting with police. In the first and last days of the strike, which lasted from 10 February to 14 March, clashes extended from morning to night.[12]

Concentrations of support and a large demonstration that took place at the end of February, as well as mediation by members of regional and national governments, were not enough to reach a deal. After a month, the pressure produced by such a hard and prolonged conflict resulted in an open division between the unions, which also affected alliances and strategies that had been held since the years of the industrial restructuring. Both the CCOO and UGT leadership were in favour of accepting an agreement renouncing the defence of temporary jobs, while the CSI was left alone in its stance of continuing the strike. An assembly of more than 500 workers discussed both alternatives for 8 hours until a vote decided,

12 Vega Garcia, "Cerrando el círculo".

by a narrow margin, to end the strike, with the explicit threat of definitive closure weighing upon them. The defeat suffered by workers in the conflict against the dismissal of casual workers marked the inexorable decline of the shipyard, which would continue for nine more years.

In 2003, the Orejas industrial group gave up their ownership of the shipyard. Their shares passed into the hands of various managers, the majority of shares going to the yard manager, Galo Baizán. In 2004 he left. Shares were transferred to a new owner, the Dike Global SL Company of Madrid. By then, the management of the company had been assumed by PYMAR.[13] In a critical situation, with closure of the shipyard looming, this appeared to be the only possibility of survival as an emergency solution. In response to the continuing uncertainty a new phase of radical demonstrations took place throughout 2004 with the double aim of pressure to obtain workload and to neutralise any urban plan that would allow non-industrial use for the shipyard site. The overcoming of this stance led to a further reduction in the workforce, leaving only 170 workers, and left in addition a source of lasting social tension stemming from the arrest and imprisonment of two trade unionists of CSI because of their participation in protests.

PYMAR ran Naval Gijón through appointed administrators in a period of mounting debts and losses while allegedly seeking a buyer for the shipyard. Meanwhile, debts continued to mount with an option being discussed of selling its ownership of the land containing the shipyard. Such a sell-off could reclassify the land for residential use, and generate substantial capital gains for new owners. Indeed, the surrounding neighbourhood experienced, with the closure of other shipyards and industries, an urban transformation in which the price of property appreciated throughout the area.[14] Given this possible scenario, the workforce intensified their complaints about the lack

13 PYMAR is a public limited company established in 1985 by small and medium-sized private Spanish shipyards to protect the interests of private shipbuilding in Spain and throughout Europe. It carries out its work in close collaboration with the state government and the autonomous regions. At one point PYMAR brought together as many as twenty-four private shipyards, which compete with each other but also hold common strategic positions. It is a governing body of the sector which co-ordinates and promotes the decisions adopted by mutual agreement of its members for the benefit of one of the longest-standing industries in Spain. With the aim of achieving an improvement in its shipyards' competitiveness, it has access to key mechanisms which are extremely important to the shipping sector. These include the Shipbuilding Guarantee Fund, which is aimed at facilitating the implementation of shipbuilding projects in Spain. Among PYMAR's activities are the provision of technical, legal, and financial/tax consultancy services to help shipyards bring their construction projects to fruition.

14 Alonso, "Astilleros varados".

of willingness to continue shipbuilding and what seemed to them to be the existence of a hidden purpose of closure to benefit property speculators.

The criminalisation of the two main leaders of the CSI took place against a background of reducing the workforce through early retirement; for the first time, such reductions were accepted as mandatory by the other two unions (UGT and CCOO). The forced departure from the shipyard for mere reasons of age and without acquiescence of some trade unionists who opposed the agreements, and who rejected the early retirements as a path which could only lead to closure, weighed increasingly on the minds of the older workers. On the other hand, some of the older workers felt that the plan put an end to the uncertainty suffered for such a long time by means of a definitive exit from the labour market with an acceptable level of compensation. Those who were members of the CSI tended to be younger workers and had a greater interest in the continuity of work in the shipyard. The combination of this generational factor with the charisma and authority exerted by some CSI leaders allowed this union, traditionally confined to manual workers and with no presence in offices, to recruit among technical staff, administration, and even managerial staff, whose relative youth made them appreciate the determination with which CSI rejected any prospect of closure.[15]

This process of reductions in staff and increased indebtedness, leading to closure, was accompanied by a wave of new demonstrations which retained considerable social support and captured the attention of institutions and the news media.

The arrest of two members of the CSI accused of public disorder as a result of the 2005 demonstrations became a thorny problem which resounded for years, highlighting political, judicial, and police contradictions. Two years later, they were sentenced to three years in prison, while a persistent social mobilisation expressed support through demonstrations, and signs of solidarity under many different forms. A song and two documentary films composed the sound and audiovisual chronicle of a campaign which gave rise to the creation in the city of a citizen platform against authoritarian repression. Their imprisonment in the summer of 2007 provoked a reaction that led, just nineteen days later, to releasing the men from prison and then to a partial pardon.[16]

15 Testimonies of Zaza González-Llanos and Alejandro Alonso, engineers at Naval Gijón, Archivo de Fuentes Orales para la Historia Social de Asturias (AFOHSA), serie Culturas del Trabajo.

16 The story of the imprisonment of these union activists has been told in two 2007 documentary films: Alejandro Zapico, *El astillero* (*disculpen las molestias*), and Ruth Arias, *Cándido y Morala, ni un paso atrás*.

Table 10.2 Naval Gijón's workforce

Year	Workers
1985	742
1987	745
1990	595
1994	582
2000	349
2003	183
2005	109
2009	96

Source: Company and union documents

In 2007 the shipyard had just 101 permanent workers, although it generated hundreds of indirect jobs. The situation had already resulted in suffocating debt, resulting from failure to comply with all of the targets set in the action plan for the period 2004-2006, with the exception of early retirements. The promise of investment amounting to €9 mn, to keep the shipyard viable, was not realised, and the company's approach consisted of a closure plan. This possibility was accepted by two trade unions (UGT and CCOO) and by the regional government, but was rejected by the CSI. For the first time, the minister of industry of the Asturian government spoke out openly in favour of closure of the shipyard, with arguments expressed in terms of profitability and punishing the obstinacy of some workers in defence of their jobs.

Although the end of shipbuilding activity was initially set for 2008, Naval Gijón lasted until the middle of 2009, with workers continuing to sustain actions several years later. Throughout November 2008, workers were on strike which, as usual, was accompanied by demonstrations in the street (fire barricades, traffic stoppages, and clashes) until the workforce finally accepted on 4 December an agreement which, for the first time, did not guarantee coverage for all workers. Only workers aged fifty-three years or older could access early retirement, while forty-two younger workers were promised relocation to the neighbouring shipyard Juliana. This proved to be no more than a delay, as the Juliana shipyard ceased activity only six months later.

Even when the agreement to close the shipyard had been signed, conflict reappeared in its last weeks of activity. Action by sixty workers for twenty-two days, accompanied by daily demonstrations, demanded guarantees

of compliance with the commitments acquired with the pensioners.[17] This matter was ultimately resolved and workers abandoned the action. Naval Gijón closed its gates and ceased all activity on 31 May 2009. In the following months, its facilities were dismantled, and cranes and gates that surrounded the dry dock were scrapped. The speed that administrators of property exhibited in this scrapping and the passive attitude shown by the authorities seemed to indicate a desire to erase as soon as possible the most visible vestiges of an uncomfortable memory starring an extraordinarily confrontational collective of workers. The potential redevelopment of the shipyard has not been thus far been confirmed. The deep economic crisis, one of whose main dimensions in the Spanish case is the bursting of the housing bubble and consequent paralysis in the building sector, has put on hold the future destiny of the facilities and the ground of the shipyard.

17 Another documentary film reflects this last conflict: Jaime Santos and Vanesa Castano, *Prejubilandia, una verdad incómoda* (2009).

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